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Abstract. We model the financial cooperative as an optimal institution sharing liq-
uidity risks among agents with social preference and group identity. Stronger social
concerns imply objectively better (worse) conditions for borrowers (depositors). Test-
ing the model, we find that, indeed, deposit and loan rates offered by U.S. credit
unions between 1995 and 2014 co-moved with (i) the number of members, and (ii) the
common bond. Our theory explains how cooperatives coexist with banks, and why
they have tended to be more resilient. However, the analysis also suggests that fi-
nancial inclusion and advantages in resilience might quickly evaporate as membership
requirements get diluted.
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1. Introduction
Why are credit unions so popular? How do they create value for their members?
How do they fend off competition, given that they are often very small? The existing
literature has tended to provide answers to such questions predominantly by referring
to the particularities of developing economies. For example, as suggested by the work
of Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990), monitoring may be more cost-efficient in a small
community than in a large anonymous market. Further, as discussed by Banerjee
et al. (1994), there may be benefits of joint liability, similar to those identified for
microfinance structures in the work of Besley and Coate (1995) and Armenda´riz de
Aghion (1999). However, these mechanisms seem to apply overall somewhat less to
developed economies like the United States.1 The existing literature has also not been
very successful in capturing the moral and ethical principles of the cooperative banking
model, which have often been emphasized as its main distinctive feature.2
The present paper proposes an alternative way to think about the financial co-
operative. Our approach is based on the observation that people living in the same
community, working for the same employer, or sharing the same religion, tend to per-
ceive themselves as members of a group, and that their individual well-being may
depend to some extent also on the social situation in that reference group.3 Starting
from this idea, we develop a social identity theory of the financial cooperative. Specifi-
1Relatedly, in the early days of the credit union, the common bond requirement may have served
as a substitute for credit ratings (Goddard et al., 2008). However, the advent of nationwide credit
bureaus seems to have eliminated most of this informational benefit (Walter, 2006).
2Indeed, financial cooperatives are typically mutually owned, stake-holder oriented, and set up
as not-for-profit organizations (Groeneveld, 2014). Like many other cooperative institutions, they
promote the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity (Groene-
veld, 2011; International Co-operative Alliance, 2019).
3Needless to say, the psychological notion of social group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) has
been incorporated into the economics literature over the last two decades through contributions by
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Goette et al. (2006), and Chen
and Li (2009), among others. Similarly, the insight that social preferences enter decision-making has
found its way into economic theory many years ago by the work of Loewenstein et al. (1989), Bolton
(1991), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), in particular.
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cally, we argue that the possibility that other members of the cooperative end up with
substantially less (or more) may be a concern for people, which may therefore create
a demand for enhanced liquidity insurance that also accommodates such risk. Thus,
we model the cooperative as a financial intermediary that offers services specifically
for members of a group with some social identity. This approach proves to be both
tractable and useful. In particular, our analysis suggests a way to reconcile existing
institutional models of the credit union with mainstream banking theory. The theory
explains how cooperative banks are able to compete with commercial banks even in
the absence of informational advantages or differences in regulation. It also suggests
a natural way for understanding why credit unions and banks prefer different gover-
nance structures. Last but not least, the model admits formal conclusions regarding
the superior resilience of the financial cooperative.
The paper has two main parts: (i) theory, and (ii) empirical test. In the theoretical
part, the financial cooperative is modeled as an optimal institution sharing liquidity
risks (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), where we will initially assume a
finite number of depositors (Green and Lin, 2003; Ennis and Keister, 2009). We show
that the key findings of the traditional analysis extend to the case of social preferences.
Specifically, the first-best allocation is seen to balance the (socially adapted) rate of
return on market investments with the marginal rate of substitution between the re-
spective (subjective) consumption levels of savers and borrowers. Moreover, demand
deposit contracts implement the first best, just as in the case of selfish preferences.
Our main theoretical result, however, concerns the comparative statics of objective
consumption levels. Under mild assumptions, including non-excessive financial mar-
ket returns and nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, we show that the first-period
consumption level is monotone increasing in the parameters measuring the strength
of social preference. Based on this result, we hypothesize that interest rates offered
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by the financial cooperative (i) correlate positively with the size of the cooperative’s
membership base, and (ii) vary with the nature of the cooperative’s group identity.
To test these hypotheses, we compose accounting data of more than 6’300 U.S.
credit unions in the period from 1995 to 2014, as well as macroeconomic data for the
same period. Using this combined data set, we estimate the determinants of deposit
and loan rates. It turns out that, all else equal, both interest rates are significantly
higher in credit unions with a larger member base. This is consistent with the general
empirical observation that, as the number of members of a group increases, there tends
to be less identification with the group and less engagement for the achievement of
common goals.4 Further, we observe significantly lower interest rates in community
and faith-based credit unions than in occupational credit unions. Thus, the empirical
analysis indeed provides some support for our theoretical predictions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some in-
stitutional background. The theoretical analysis is presented in Section 3. Section
4 contains the empirical part. Extensions are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 con-
cludes. Three appendices cover proofs, the case of constant relative risk aversion, and
definitions of econometric variables, respectively.
2. Institutional background
In the US, the predominant form of financial cooperative is the credit union. According
to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), there were 6’229 credit unions
in 2014 that held assets worth USD 1.1 trillion, equivalent to 7% of total bank assets
in the economy, and serving about 100 million member-customers. Since 1934, credit
4Related effects of group size on individual behavior have been documented in the psychological
literature under the heading of diffusion of responsibility (Darley and Latane´, 1968; Latane´ and Nida,
1981; Brewer and Kramer, 1986). In the economics literature, group size effects have been studied
in public good games (Fleishman, 1980; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Isaac et al., 1994; Barron and
Yechiam, 2002), in prisoner’s dilemma settings (Diekmann, 1985), and for variants of the dictator
game (Cason and Mui, 1997; Stahl and Haruvy, 2006; Panchanathan et al., 2013; Schuhmacher et
al., 2017; Robson, 2018), in particular.
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unions must be registered as not-for-profit organizations that pursue the economic
and social objectives of their members. The governance of credit unions follows a one-
member-one-vote principle, and most offices are not compensated. Eligibility criteria
for membership, known as the common bond, may be defined in terms of a community,
association (e.g., church or fraternity), or occupation (Emmons and Schmid, 1999;
Frame et al., 2002). Most credit unions are either (i) federally chartered, or (ii)
state-chartered and federally insured. Those credit unions are regulated by NCUA,
and their members are protected by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund
(NCUSIF). The interests of U.S. credit unions are represented by the Credit Union
National Association (CUNA). Over the past decades, credit unions have grown into
full service financial providers, and have also become direct competitors to commercial
retail banks (Feinberg, 2001). The fact that credit unions have remained exempt from
federal income taxes continues to cause some controversy.
Besides the U.S., credit unions constitute an important part of the financial system
in many other countries, including Ireland, Canada, and Australia, for instance. In
the UK, however, the cooperative banking sector is represented mainly by several
dozens of building societies. In continental Europe, the prevalent form of the financial
cooperative is the cooperative bank. Cooperative banks are organized in large networks
known as cooperative banking groups that accounted in 2016, on average, for more
than 20% of the loan and deposit markets. In contrast to the U.S. model, there is no
common bond requirement for customers. Notwithstanding, owing to a local business
model, cooperative banks typically have a relatively homogeneous customer base.5
5For a more comprehensive account of the credit union in the U.S., we refer the reader to McKillop
and Wilson (2011, 2015). The World Council of Credit Unions (2018) offers a global perspective. For
the European market, see European Association of Co-operative Banks (2018).
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3. Theory
3.1 The model
We study the social interaction of a group of n ≥ 2 ex-ante identical agents that
are exposed to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. There are two periods. In each period
t ∈ {1, 2}, the representative agent is endowed with a positive amount of et > 0 units
of the homogeneous consumption good. Endowments may be either consumed in the
same period or traded in an anonymous financial market. Specifically, for any unit
invested in period 1, the market offers R > 1 units in period 2. Similarly, for any unit
given up in period 2, the market offers 1
R
units in period 1. We denote by cit ∈ R+
agent i’s consumption in period t ∈ {1, 2}.
At some anticipated point in time within period 1, a given number n1 of agents are
randomly selected as impatient, while the remaining n2 = n− n1 agents are patient.6
We will assume throughout that n1 ≥ 1 and n2 ≥ 1. Agent i’s total consumption is
defined as
ci = ci1 + θ
ici2, (1)
where θi = θ ∈ (0, 1
R
) if agent i is impatient, and θi = θ ≡ 1 if agent i is patient. When
there is no risk of confusion, we will refer to ci simply as i’s objective consumption.
Following the literature on social preferences, in particular Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Engelmann (2006), agent i’s subjective consumption will be defined as
c˜i = ci − α
g(n)
∑
j 6=i
max{cj − ci, 0} − β
g(n)
∑
j 6=i
max{ci − cj, 0}, (2)
where α and β are the usual envy and compassion parameters satisfying α ≥ β ≥ 0 and
β < 1, while g(n) is a normalization factor capturing group size n. Thus, each agent
dislikes differences between her own objective consumption and any other agent’s ob-
6Thus, we assume that the total number of patient agents is common knowledge. We conjecture
though that our results do not depend on this simplifying assumption.
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jective consumption.7 Regarding group-size normalization, we assume that the ratio
g(n)
n−1 is weakly increasing in n. Moreover, to ensure consistency with the literature
on inequality aversion, we impose g(2) = 1. For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
worked with the linear normalization g(n) = n − 1, which obviously satisfies our
assumptions.8 Each agent i maximizes her expected utility from subjective consump-
tion, E[U(c˜i)], where U denotes the utility function, assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable with U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. It should be noted that an agent’s utility
depends only on her own objective consumption and on the empirical distribution of
objective consumption levels in the relevant reference group.
Clearly, an impatient agent (a patient agent) arranges for consuming exclusively
at the end of period 1 (period 2). In view of this fact, we define an allocation as a
pair (c1, c2), where c1 and c2, respectively, denote objective consumption levels for the
impatient and for the patient type. The first-best allocation (c∗1, c
∗
2) maximizes the
ex-ante expected utility of the representative agent subject to the resource constraint
implied by the trading possibilities in the financial market. To guarantee positive
consumption levels in the first-best allocation, we assume that U satisfies Inada’s
conditions, i.e., limc˜→0 U ′(c˜) = ∞ and limc˜→∞ U ′(c˜) = 0. We also impose standard
assumptions on relative risk aversion ensuring the efficiency of risk sharing, i.e., we
assume −c˜U ′′(c˜)/U ′(c˜) > 1 for any c˜ > 0.
The following result characterizes the first-best allocation in our setup.
7In the present context, envy corresponds to the borrower’s dissatisfaction with a perceived lack
in solidarity, and compassion to the saver’s desire to show responsibility vis-a`-vis others that are in a
disadvantaged position. For convenience, however, we will stick to the terminology commonly used
in the literature on social preferences.
8For a dictator game with n − 1 recipients, Engelmann (2012) argued that g(n) should grow at
a sublinear rate, e.g., g(n) =
√
n− 1. Actually, that normalization does not satisfy our assumption.
However, in our specific application, it seems more natural to allow for the possibility that g grows at
a superlinear rate (say, g(n) = (n−1)ρ with ρ > 1), which reflects weaker and ultimately diminishing
social preferences in a larger reference group. Obviously, this is also what the empirical analysis
implies.
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Proposition 1. (First Best) Let
R˜ =
R− β n1R+n2
g(n)
1 + αn1R+n2
g(n)
. (3)
If R˜ > 1, then the first-best allocation (c∗1, c
∗
2) is characterized by the marginal condi-
tion
U ′ (c˜∗1)
U ′(c˜∗2)
= R˜, (4)
and the resource constraint
n1c
∗
1 + n2
c∗2
R
= n
(
e1 +
e2
R
)
, (5)
where subjective consumption levels are given by
c˜∗1 = c
∗
1 −
αn2
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1), (6)
c˜∗2 = c
∗
2 −
βn1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1). (7)
In this case, c∗1 < c
∗
2. If, however, R˜ ≤ 1, then
c∗1 = c
∗
2 =
n (Re1 + e2)
n1R + n2
. (8)
Thus, as in the case of selfish agents, the first-best allocation balances a trade-off
between efficiency and insurance. In contrast to the standard setting, however, the
trade-off is biased as a consequence of the agents’ social concerns. This is so because,
when α or β is positive, the disadvantageous treatment of the borrowers is a concern
for both savers and borrowers. As a result, the cooperative attaches a lower value
to an anonymous investment, and a higher value in making loans accessible for its
7
members. We will refer to R˜ as the socially adapted market rate of return. It is easy
to see that R˜ ≤ R. In Appendix B, we derive explicit expressions for the first-best
allocation in the case of constant relative risk aversion.
The proof of Proposition 1 considers two cases. In the first, the socially adapted
market rate R˜ exceeds one. Then, the first-best allocation implies heterogeneity in
consumption, and balances R˜ with the marginal rate of substitution between the
respective subjective consumption levels of patient and impatient agents. In this case,
the proof of Proposition 1 boils down to showing that the patient type is objectively
weakly better off than the impatient type. In the second case, R˜ ≤ 1. Then, the
first-best allocation equalizes the respective subjective consumption levels of patient
and impatient agents, so that the allocation is pinned down by the resource constraint.
In the sequel, we will focus on the first case, i.e., the case of an interior solution, which
also receives support from our empirical analysis.
3.2 Demand deposit contracts
When an agent signs a demand deposit contract, the agent’s endowments in both
periods become property of the cooperative. In return, the contract entails the right
to borrow an agreed gross amount of c1 in period 1, subject to the availability of
loanable funds in the cooperative. Further, in period 2, the capital stock of the credit
union is divided evenly among the members that did not receive a loan in period 1 (i.e.,
that either did not request a loan or did so in vain). Demands for loans in period 1 are
served sequentially in random order. Those agents that applied for and successfully
received a loan will be referred to as borrowers, while the remaining agents will be
referred to as savers.
The formal description of a demand deposit contract promising a loan size of
c1 is straightforward. Suppose that all n agents sign a deposit contract with the
cooperative. Then, granting a number of m loans will be feasible for the cooperative
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if and only if
mc1 ≤ n
(
e1 +
e2
R
)
. (9)
However, if this condition is violated for the m-th applicant, no loan is extended, which
may be seen as a form of credit rationing.9 But suppose now that m < n members
have received a loan in period 1. Then, the level of objective consumption available
in period 2 for any of the remaining n−m members is given by
ĉ2(m, c1) =
R(ne1 −mc1) + ne2
n−m . (10)
Note that ĉ2(m, c1) ≥ 0 as a consequence of (9). Moreover, if m = n1, the consumption
level c2 = ĉ2(n1, c1) just corresponds to the objective level of consumption foreseen for
each of the patient agents in period 2.
In a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, any unilateral deviation leading to a pos-
itive subjective consumption for the deviating agent strictly lowers the utility for that
agent.10 We call a demand deposit contract, augmented by a symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, optimal if it maximizes the representative agent’s ex-ante expected utility
within the class of all deposit contracts.
Proposition 2. The optimal demand deposit contract implements the first-best con-
sumption plan.
This result establishes a potentially important robustness property of demand deposit
contracts. Even accounting for group identity, a simple bilateral demand deposit
contract allows implementing the first-best allocation.
The proof of Proposition 2 checks incentive compatibility of truth-telling in the
9Thus, credit rationing may happen off the equilibrium in our framework. For an equilibrium
analysis of credit rationing, see Canning et al. (2003).
10To ensure positive subjective consumption levels for any deviating agent, it would suffice to
assume that α is not too large. See the proof of Proposition 2.
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presence of social concerns. The argument for the patient type depends on whether the
deviation causes credit rationing in period 1 or not. In the case where the deviation
does not cause rationing, it turns out that the objectively advantaged saver would
never wish to become a disadvantaged borrower, even though the deviation lessens
the borrower’s envy. In the case where the deviation actually causes rationing, there
is a lottery. With probability 1
n1+1
, the deviation has no effect because the deviating
agent gets rationed. With probability n1
n1+1
, however, one of the impatient agents gets
rationed. Again, it turns out that a deviation is not optimal for the patient type.
To check incentive compatibility for the impatient type, we show that the deviator
envies the borrowers. In sum, it turns out that the standard incentive compatibility
consideration extends to the case of social concerns.
3.3 Comparative statics
In this subsection, we study the comparative statics of the optimal demand deposit
contract with respect to α, β, and n. The following assumption will be imposed.
Assumption 1. Market returns are not too high, i.e., lnR ≤ 1. Moreover, U reflects
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion.
These conditions are not entirely implausible. In addition, we observe that, under
Assumption 1, the comparative statics takes a particularly simple form.
Proposition 3. (Comparative statics) Impose Assumption 1. Then,
(i) c∗1 is monotone increasing, and c
∗
2 monotone decreasing in both α and β;
(ii) c∗1 is monotone decreasing, and c
∗
2 monotone increasing in n (keeping the population
shares ν1 = n1/n and ν2 = n2/n constant); and
(iii) the monotonicity in parts (i) and (ii) is strict provided that R˜ > 1.
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Thus, as social preferences get stronger, the disadvantaged borrowers will receive bet-
ter conditions while, conversely, the advantaged group of savers will have to give up
some of their interest gains. Further, as the group size increases, the situation will
deteriorate for the disadvantaged borrowers. In both cases, the monotonicity is strict
in the interior.11
Unexpected to us, the mechanics of the comparative statics differs between α and
β. As α gets larger, there are two effects. First, the socially adapted rate of return
declines, which shifts the balance to the benefit of the disadvantaged borrowers. Sec-
ond, the borrowers suffer more from envy, which leads to an additional compensation.
These effects work in the same direction. In fact, Assumption 1 is not needed to
derive the comparative statics with respect to α. In contrast, an increase in β causes
two countervailing effects. First, as in the case of the envy parameter, the socially
adapted rate of return declines, which benefits the borrowers. But second, depositors
also suffer more from compassion, which is an effect working in the opposite direction.
Under Assumption 1, the first effect can be shown to dominate the second.12
To prepare the empirical analysis, we translate the objective consumption levels
for savers and borrowers, respectively, into deposit and loan rates via
ρD =
c2 − e2
e1
− 1, (11)
ρL =
e2
c1 − e1 − 1. (12)
Under Assumption 1, both ρD and ρL are weakly declining (weakly increasing) in the
degree to which members exhibit social preferences (in the number of members).
11While a similar comparative statics property may be expected for changes in risk aversion, that
would not constitute a plausible rationale for the existence of credit unions. Indeed, such explanation
would be at odds with the common bond requirement.
12In the absence of Assumption 1, the comparative statics of the compassion parameter is ambigu-
ous. A numerical example illustrating this fact can be found in Appendix B.
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and variables
The data set combines credit union panel data with macroeconomic time series. The
panel data has been collected from NCUA year-end call reports. It covers a total
of 6’376 federally chartered and federally insured credit unions. The macroeconomic
time series has been taken from the Richmond Fed’s website. The combined data set
covers the years 1995 through 2014, yielding a total of 119’519 observations.
Table I. Econometric variables
Variable Interpretation
Credit union specific variables
DEP RATE Deposit rate
LOAN RATE Loan rate
MEMBERS Number of current members
POT MEM Number of potential members
ASSETS Total assets
EQUITY Equity
RETURN Net investment return
INCOME Non-interest income
EXPENSES Non-interest expenses
TOM Type of membership (categorical)
STATE State, federal district or territory (categorical)
CONV Dummy for charter conversion
Macroeconomic variables
GDP Real gross domestic product growth rate
CPI Inflation rate
GOV RATE 1-year U.S. Treasury bill rate
LIBOR 12-month London interbank offered rate
FIN CRISIS Financial crisis dummy for the years 2007-2009
Note: Definitions of the credit union specific numerical variables are provided in Appendix C.
Table I provides an overview of the econometric variables. Credit union specific vari-
ables include nine numerical variables, two categorical variables, and a dummy. The
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numerical variables all have an immediate interpretation, so that we banished their
definitions to Appendix C. The two categorical variables capture (i) the type of mem-
bership, discussed in more detail below, and (ii) the state, district, or territory that the
credit union reported in its address.13 The dummy indicates charter conversion. I.e.,
provided that the charter changed from federal to state within the considered period,
CONV takes the value of one starting from the year in which the charter changed.
In all other instances, the variable takes the value of zero. The macroeconomic vari-
ables include growth rates for the real gross domestic product and consumer prices,
respectively, secured and unsecured market interest rates, as well as a dummy for the
financial crisis period.
Table II. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max
overall between within
DEP RATE 2.32 1.54 0.68 1.41 0.06 5.70
LOAN RATE 8.04 2.17 1.52 1.69 4.38 14.24
MEMBERS 8.16 1.48 1.51 0.21 5.04 11.81
POT MEM 9.34 2.11 2.05 0.76 5.52 14.80
ASSETS 16.67 1.84 1.85 0.36 12.15 21.05
EQUITY 14.59 1.75 1.76 0.38 10.19 18.80
RETURN 3.82 4.22 1.12 4.09 -0.30 14.97
INCOME 11.27 2.87 2.83 0.87 3.09 16.75
EXPENSES 13.32 1.86 1.88 0.37 8.55 17.53
GDP 2.40 1.65 – – -2.52 4.49
CPI 2.37 0.96 – – -0.36 3.84
GOV RATE 2.91 2.29 – – 0.12 6.11
LIBOR 3.44 2.23 – – 0.56 6.87
Note: Shown is the descriptive statistics for our numerical data. Categorical variables
and dummies have been omitted. Interest rates and growth rates are in percentage
points, while all other variables are in natural logs. For credit union data, min and
max stand for the 1st and 99th percentile, respectively. The data is annual. Source:
NCUA, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
13Credit unions in our data set reported addresses in any of the 50 U.S. states, in the District of
Columbia, in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of our data set is shown in Table II. For each numerical vari-
able, the table reports the mean, standard deviations, and the range. In addition, we
report cross-sectional (“between”) and idiosyncratic (“within”) standard deviations
for the numerical panel data.14 The information shown in the table reflects the pro-
nounced heterogeneity of the cooperative sector. In particular, as can be seen, credit
unions differ very much in the size of their membership base.
Table III. Credit unions by common bond
Type-of-membership NCUA Credit Unions Members
category codes 1995 2014 1995 2014
Community 0 480 1’101 9’500 15’000
Faith-based 1, 54 217 227 1’300 2’000
Other associational 2, 3 78 104 3’400 2’500
Education 4, 34 694 431 8’400 10’400
Government 5, 35 127 74 47’100 159’600
Military 6, 36 1’051 577 8’000 9’700
Manufacturing (single) 10-15 576 174 4’500 1’400
Services (single) 20-23 611 222 4’200 5’300
Manufacturing (multiple) 40-49 574 351 8’100 13’700
Services (multiple) 50-53 390 402 9’000 9’500
Other single or multiple bond 24, 98 255 173 11’200 23’000
State-chartered 99 631 2’393 7’700 19’400
All 0-99 5’684 6’229 8’100 16’000
Note: For each category of credit unions, the table shows (i) the defining set of NCUA
codes, (ii) the number of reporting credit unions in 1995 and 2014, respectively, and
(iii) the average number of members, again for the years 1995 and 2014, and rounded to
hundreds. Source: NCUA, own calculations.
Table III offers some descriptive statistics of the categorical variable TOM. For
each type-of-membership category, the table shows the corresponding NCUA code(s),
the number of credit unions active in the years 1995 and 2014, respectively, and the
14In the credit union specific data, we discarded observations with nonpositive values of the log-
variables as well as observations for which our interest rate variables exceeded one, as is common in
the literature (Wheelock and Wilson, 2011; Malikov et al., 2018).
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average number of members in those years. As can be seen, there is a clear trend
towards the state charter, which relaxes the common bond requirement (Birch, 2015).
4.3 Hypotheses
As discussed in the Introduction, our modeling is based upon the presumption that the
strength of the group identity within a financial cooperative, and hence, the strength of
social preferences, (i) diminishes in the number of members, and (ii) is dependent also
on the nature of the common bond. This leads us to the following testable implications
of our theoretical analysis, which will serve as hypotheses for our subsequent empirical
analysis.
Hypothesis 1. Credit unions with a larger member base offer higher deposit rates,
and require higher loan rates than credit unions with a smaller member base.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of the common bond has the same sign for deposit and loan
rates.
4.4 Empirical model
To test our hypotheses, we consider the econometric model
DEP RATEi,t = δ
D
0,i + CU VAR
′
i,t δ
D
1 + MACRO VAR
′
t δ
D
2 + ε
D
i,t (13)
LOAN RATEi,t = δ
L
0,i + CU VAR
′
i,t δ
L
1 + MACRO VAR
′
t δ
L
2 + ε
L
i,t, (14)
where δD0,i and δ
L
0,i are idiosyncratic effects, CU VARi,t is a vector comprising all ex-
planatory credit union specific variables, MACRO VARt is the vector of the macroe-
conomic variables, δD1 , δ
L
1 , δ
D
2 , and δ
L
2 are the corresponding vectors of regression
coefficients, and εDi,t and ε
L
i,t are the error terms. We estimate our econometric model
equation-by-equation using the random effects method.15
15The fixed effects method is not applicable because of the presence of dummies.
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4.5 Results
Table IV reports the main results of our regression analysis.
Table IV. Estimation results
DEP RATE LOAN RATE
Credit union specific variables
MEMBERS 0.478∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
POT MEM -0.088∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
ASSETS 1.188∗∗∗ -0.782∗∗∗
EQUITY -0.551∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗
RETURN 0.041∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
INCOME -0.069∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗
EXPENSES -0.896∗∗∗ -0.071
TOM – see Table V –
STATE – not reported –
CONV -0.401∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗
Macroeconomic variables
GDP -0.034∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
CPI -0.179∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
GOV RATE 0.330∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
LIBOR 0.139∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗
FIN CRISIS 0.205∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
R2 (overall) 0.65 0.38
Obs. 119’519 119’519
Note: Shown are the coefficients resulting from the random effects re-
gression of the empirical model (13)–(14), where standard errors have
been corrected for clustering on the credit union. The coefficients for the
categorical variable TOM are shown in Table V below. The coefficients
for the categorical variable STATE are not reported. */**/*** indicate
significance levels of p = 0.05/p = 0.01/p = 0.001, respectively.
We start with the most important observation, viz. that MEMBERS has a positive
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and significant coefficient both for the deposit rate and the loan rate.16 It is crucial to
acknowledge that this finding is unlikely to be driven by the economies of scale related
to cost savings per member. Indeed, deposit and loan rates are seen to co-move in
the size of the membership base, which is in conflict with the natural implication of
economies of scale. Thus, we indeed obtain support for Hypothesis 1.
The effects of the other credit union specific variables are broadly in line with
expectation. The size of potential membership (POT MEM) has a small negative
effect on both interest rates. This suggests that social concerns are somewhat stronger
in a credit union whose membership base is only a small subset of the potential
membership base. The signs of the coefficients of ASSETS is consistent with the
prevalent view in the literature that credit unions work under economies of scale
(Wheelock and Wilson, 2011; Malikov et al., 2018). Next, more conservative equity
standards (EQUITY) lead to lower dividends, but might also correlate with more
conservative lending standards, thereby lowering the loan rates. The respective effects
of net investment returns (RETURN) and non-interest income (INCOME) are very
small. Operating costs (EXPENSES) translate into lower dividends, but do not seem
to matter for loan rates. Finally, the coefficients of the conversion dummy CONV
are negative and significant. Thus, credit unions that chose to relax their membership
requirement tend to offer lower interest rates than credit unions that have always been
state-chartered. We see this as evidence for Hypothesis 2. However, we will discuss
the role of the common bond in more detail below.
Also the coefficients for the macroeconomic variables are overall plausible. Growth
(GDP) and inflation (CPI) have a negative effect on interest rates. Further, we ob-
serve predominantly positive correlations between credit union rates and the bench-
mark rates GOV RATE and LIBOR. Lastly, the regression indicates that during the
16Doubling the membership base is predicted to lead to an increase in the deposit rate by 0.478×
ln(2)×100 = 33 basis points and an increase in the loan rate by 1.357× ln(2)×100 = 94 basis points.
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financial crisis (FIN CRISIS), credit unions offered better conditions not only for de-
positors (possibly to attract funds), but also for borrowers (possibly due to a more
restrictive lending policy).
Table V. Common bond effects
Type-of-membership DEP RATE LOAN RATE
category
Community 0.000 0.000
Faith-based -0.420∗∗∗ -0.282∗
Other associational 0.284∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗
Education 0.085∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗
Government 0.102∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
Military 0.276∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
Manufacturing (single) 0.394∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
Services (single) 0.216∗∗∗ 0.092
Manufacturing (multiple) 0.170∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
Services (multiple) 0.115∗∗∗ 0.098∗
Other single and multiple bond 0.106∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗
State-chartered 0.112∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗
Note: Shown are the regression coefficients for the categorical variable
TOM omitted from Table IV. The coefficients for the community category
have been normalized to zero. */**/*** indicate significance levels of
p = 0.05/p = 0.01/p = 0.001, respectively.
4.6 The common bond
In Table V, we report the regression coefficients of the categorical variable TOM. The
coefficient for the community category has been normalized to zero. Thus, a negative
(positive) coefficient suggests stronger (weaker) social concerns than in the average
residential credit union. The role of the common bond is most salient in faith-based
credit unions, as these unions set the lowest interest rates. Relative to the community
category, all occupational credit unions set higher interest rates. Thus, the common
bond moves interest rates for savers and borrowers in the same direction, indicating
also here a comovement. We therefore see these findings as support for Hypothesis 2.
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5. Extensions
In this section, we discuss (1) the coexistence of cooperative and commercial banks,
(2) the distributional conflict between savers and borrowers, and (3) the resilience of
the financial cooperative.
5.1 Coexistence of cooperative and commercial banks
Our theoretical framework suggests a surprisingly simple answer to the question of
how cooperatives may coexist with commercial banks.17 To see this, imagine a large
population of agents with heterogeneous preferences for egalitarian treatment. Specif-
ically, suppose that a share νS > 0 of the population is selfish for whom envy and
compassion parameter vanish, and a share νP > 0 of the population is prosocial for
whom envy and compassion parameters α and β satisfy the assumptions made be-
fore. Further, we consider now social preferences with linear group-size normalization
g(n) = n − 1, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and consider the limit for n → ∞. To
have heterogeneity, we assume that α > 0. In each of the two subpopulations, the
probability of being impatient and patient is ν1 and ν2, respectively, where we assume
ν1 > 0 and ν2 > 0. We will assume that profit-maximizing risk-neutral banks compete,
under free entry, by offering an allocation (c1, c2) to the agents. In fact, our argument
allows also for the possibility that a subset of the competitors have a not-for-profit
orientation.18
Proposition 4. Suppose that R˜ > 1. Then, the following two conclusions hold true:
(i) There is no pooling equilibrium.
(ii) There is a separating equilibrium in which all intermediaries earn zero profits.
17Differences in taxation in itself do not constitute a satisfactory explanation because, for example,
numerous small banks in the U.S. are organized as Subchapter S corporations, and as a result, enjoy
tax exemptions like most credit unions (Walter, 2006, pp. 363-364).
18Hart and Moore (1996, 1998) study how market performance of firms depends on governance. In
the case of the financial cooperative, we believe that mutual ownership is a way to strengthen group
identity. The empirical investigation of this relationship seems neglected though.
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Thus, the conclusions are similar to those known from the theory of competitive
insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Also the proof is similar. In fact,
the proof is even simpler because a bank’s profit from attracting an agent does not
depend on whether the agent is selfish or prosocial.19 Specifically, noting that the
first-best consumption pairs for selfish and prosocial agents differ by Proposition 3, one
observes that a bank deviating from pooling could obtain positive profits by offering
a consumption pair close to the first-best consumption pair for one of the two social
preference types. As a result, a pooling equilibrium would not be robust against the
corresponding deviation of an intermediary. Instead, a separating equilibrium can be
constructed in which intermediaries offer allocations (or interest rate pairs) tailor-made
either for selfish or for selfish agents.
5.2 The distributional conflict between savers and borrowers
The institutional literature on credit unions, represented by Taylor (1970), Walker
and Chandler (1977), Smith et al. (1981), and Smith (1984), has tended to emphasize
the conflict of interests between savers and borrowers. Smith (1984), for example,
assumed that the credit union maximizes a weighted sum of lender and borrower
margins under imperfect competition. Our model shares with those papers that the
interest rate policy of the cooperative is a compromise between the opposing objectives
of two different groups of members. Indeed, the first-best objective consumption plan
in our model maximizes the ex-ante expected utility from subjective consumption,
E[U ] = ν1U(c˜1) + ν2U(c˜2), (15)
subject to the resource constraint. However, in contrast to the existing literature, the
19This would change, of course, if social preference and patience types were correlated. However, we
conjecture that, under additional assumptions, the conclusion of Proposition 4 extends to correlated
types.
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conflict between savers and borrowers is resolved here at the ex ante stage, i.e., before a
member learns her type. Still, there is certainly a sense in which our analysis formally
captures the important distributional conflict between savers and borrowers in a credit
union, and thereby reconciles two hitherto independent strands of the literature.20
5.3 Resilience of the financial cooperative
It has been widely noted that U.S. credit unions have withstood the financial crisis
much better than many banks (see, e.g., McKillop and Wilson, 2015). Relatedly, the
credit union deposit insurance scheme survived the S&L crisis of the 1980s without
falling into a state of accounting insolvency and without any taxpayer bailout (Kane
and Hendershott, 1996). Similarly, in continental Europe, co-operative banks gener-
ally hold larger reserves, and have lower but less volatile levels of profitability than
commercial banks (European Association of Co-operative Banks, 2010). Cooperative
banks were also responsible for a disproportionately small share of write-downs and
financial aids during the crisis.21
Our theoretical framework is consistent with these observations. Under the as-
sumptions of Proposition 3, a preference for egalitarian treatment makes credit union
members seek flatter consumption schedules in comparison to the optimal arrangement
with selfish preferences. But a flatter consumption schedule has important implica-
tions for an intermediary’s resilience against unanticipated shocks. Indeed, in our
framework, net investment of the optimal liquidity-pooling institution is given by
I = ne1 − n1c∗1. (16)
20However, we have to leave for future work the integration of a dynamic perspective, as in Rubin
et al. (2013).
21For a general and country-specific review of financial cooperatives and their performance during
the crisis, see Crear (2009) and Birchall (2013). Hesse and Cˇiha´k (2007) offer a broader discussion
of the role of the cooperative sector for financial stability.
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Therefore, as α or β increases, c∗1 rises, so that I is declining. As a result, the cooper-
ative designed for members with social preferences is predicted to be less exposed to
an unanticipated shock in investment returns than its counterpart institution that is
designed to serve customers with purely selfish preferences.22 Note also that our model
implies an improved resilience for credit unions even in the absence of differences in
governance. Therefore, our argument for resilience complements an earlier argument
by Smith and Woodbury (2010) who attributed differences in resilience to governance
issues.
Finally, our model predicts that an increase in n, keeping ν1 and ν2 fixed, raises
the market exposure per saving individual, which is given by
I
n2
=
e1
ν2
− ν1
ν2
c∗1. (17)
This lends support to the view that the recently observed dilution of common bond
requirements, say, by conversion from federal charter to state charter, change to the
community common bond, or by adopting multiple common bonds, may lead to less
resilience in the cooperative sector (Frame et al., 2002; Ely, 2014; Birch, 2015).23
6. Conclusion
Both in the U.S. and abroad, the credit union and related institutional forms of the
financial cooperative have established themselves as an important pillar of the modern
financial industry. While specific benefits of the cooperative model have been iden-
22This comforting conclusion might dramatically change, however, in the absence of deposit in-
surance. As noted by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), depository institutions may become more
vulnerable to panic-based bank runs when they offer more risk sharing. Iyer and Puri (2012) provide
empirical evidence that a stronger connectedness among depositors, which might be expected in a
cooperative, can result in more contagious bank runs. Relatedly, Cassar and Wydick (2010) exper-
imentally demonstrate that a socially grounded financial institution can be less stable with respect
to individual deviating behavior than a standard financial institution.
23For a different view, see van Rijn (2018).
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tified for underdeveloped economies, the literature has struggled with explaining the
distinctive nature of the financial cooperative in advanced economies.
In this paper, we have interpreted the financial cooperative as an intermediary
that offers banking services to members of a group with some social identity. In this
interpretation, members of the cooperative are not satisfied with insuring themselves
against the risk of lower consumption, but they wish to take measures also to reduce
the risk that they or others fall substantially behind within the group. As borrowers
are disadvantaged compared to savers, these social concerns lead to better conditions
for credit within the group, made possible by deposit rates for members that are below
those that purely selfish behavior would imply. Moreover, as a larger fraction of the
deposits gets invested in loans to members, there is less investment in anonymous
markets, and consequently less exposure to shocks in the wider financial industry.
Our empirical findings unambiguously suggest a dilution of social concerns in credit
unions with a larger membership base. We also observe that the type of the common
bond, i.e., residential, associational, or occupational, plays a significant role for so-
cial concerns. These findings are in line with the large body of evidence regarding
group identity and group size effects. For our specific application, these theories have
important practical implications. Specifically, our analysis suggests that the before-
mentioned benefits of the cooperative banking model (viz. improved conditions for
obtaining credit and higher resilience with respect to unanticipated shocks) are less
likely to develop when the financial cooperative becomes too large, or when the com-
mon bond requirements are too much relaxed.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The first-best consumption plan (c∗1, c
∗
2) maximizes the
representative agent’s ex-ante expected utility subject to the resource constraint. Since
R > 1, patient types consume exclusively in period 2. Similarly, since θR < 1,
impatient types consume exclusively in period 1. Therefore, (c∗1, c
∗
2) solves
max
c1,c2
n1U (c˜1) + n2U (c˜2) (18)
s.t. c˜1 = c1 − αn2
g(n)
max{c2 − c1, 0} − βn2
g(n)
max{c1 − c2, 0} (19)
c˜2 = c2 − αn1
g(n)
max{c1 − c2, 0} − βn1
g(n)
max{c2 − c1, 0} (20)
n1c1 +
n2c2
R
≤ n
(
e1 +
e2
R
)
. (21)
We begin the analysis of problem (18)-(21) by making two observations.
Lemma A.1 The resource constraint (21) is binding.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that (21) held with strict inequality at (c∗1, c
∗
2).
Then, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, the consumption plan (c1, c2) = (c
∗
1 + ε, c
∗
2 + ε)
satisfies (21). As a result, c˜1 > c˜
∗
1 and c˜2 > c˜
∗
2. Thus, the representative agent’s
expected utility could be raised, in conflict with the optimality of (c∗1, c
∗
2). 
Lemma A.2 c∗1 ≤ c∗2.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that c∗1 > c
∗
2. Then, the envy (compassion) term
vanishes for the borrowers (savers). Hence, (c∗1, c
∗
2) locally solves
max
c1,c2
n1U
(
c1 − βn2
g(n)
(c1 − c2)
)
+ n2U
(
c2 − αn1
g(n)
(c1 − c2)
)
(22)
s.t. n1c1 + n2
c2
R
= n
(
e1 +
e2
R
)
. (23)
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Letting λ denote the multiplier of (23), the first-order necessary conditions read
n1
(
1− βn2
g(n)
)
U ′ (c˜∗1)−
αn1n2
g(n)
U ′ (c˜∗2)− λn1 = 0, (24)
βn1n2
g(n)
U ′ (c˜∗1) + n2
(
1 +
αn1
g(n)
)
U ′ (c˜∗2)− λ
n2
R
= 0, (25)
where
c˜∗1 = c
∗
1 −
βn2
g(n)
(c∗1 − c∗2), (26)
c˜∗2 = c
∗
2 −
αn1
g(n)
(c∗1 − c∗2). (27)
We eliminate λ from the system of equations (24)-(25), and get
(
1− βn1R + n2
g(n)
)
U ′ (c˜∗1) =
(
R + α
n1R + n2
g(n)
)
U ′ (c˜∗2) . (28)
Since U ′ > 0, this implies 1− β n1R+n2
g(n)
> 0. Therefore,
U ′ (c˜∗1)
U ′(c˜∗2)
=
R + αRn1+n2
g(n)
1− βRn1+n2
g(n)
, (29)
The right-hand side of (29) clearly exceeds one. Hence, U ′ (c˜∗1) > U
′ (c˜∗2). But then
U ′′ < 0 implies that c˜∗1 < c˜
∗
2. However, since β < 1 and n2 ≤ n− 1 ≤ g(n),
c˜∗1 − c˜∗2 = (c∗1 − c∗2)
(
1 +
αn1
g(n)
− βn2
g(n)
)
> 0. (30)
The contradiction shows that c∗1 ≤ c∗2, as claimed. 
By Lemma A.2, the compassion (envy) term vanishes for the borrowers (savers). Prob-
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lem (18)-(21) may, therefore, be rewritten as
max
c1,c2
n1U
(
c1 − αn2
g(n)
(c2 − c1)
)
+ n2U
(
c2 − βn1
g(n)
(c2 − c1)
)
(31)
s.t. n1c1 +
n2c2
R
= n
(
e1 +
e2
R
)
(32)
c1 ≤ c2. (33)
Let µ and ν, respectively, denote the multipliers for constraints (32) and (33). We
obtain the first-order conditions
n1
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
)
U ′ (c˜∗1) +
βn1n2
g(n)
U ′ (c˜∗2)− µn1 − ν = 0, (34)
−αn1n2
g(n)
U ′ (c˜∗1) + n2
(
1− βn1
g(n)
)
U ′ (c˜∗2)−
µn2
R
+ ν = 0, (35)
where c˜∗1 and c˜
∗
2 are given by (6) and (7), respectively. In addition, we get the com-
plementary slackness conditions
ν ≥ 0, (36)
(c∗1 − c∗2)ν = 0. (37)
Eliminating the parameter µ in the linear system (34)-(35), and solving for the re-
maining parameter ν, one arrives at
ν =
n1n2
n1R + n2
{
U ′ (c˜∗1)
(
1 + α
n1R + n2
g(n)
)
− U ′ (c˜∗2)
(
R− βn1R + n2
g(n)
)}
. (38)
Exploiting now the complementary slackness condition (36), this yields
U ′ (c˜∗1)
U ′(c˜∗2)
≥ R˜. (39)
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Moreover, from (37), a strict inequality feasible in (39) only if c∗1 = c
∗
2. We will
distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose first that R˜ > 1. Then, inequality (39) in combination with U ′′ < 0
implies c˜∗1 < c˜
∗
2. But from
c˜∗1 − c˜∗2 = (c∗1 − c∗2)
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
− βn1
g(n)
)
, (40)
recalling that β < 1 and n1 ≤ n − 1, it follows that c∗1 < c∗2, so that (39) necessarily
holds with equality.
Case 2. Suppose next that R˜ ≤ 1. If, in addition, inequality (39) is strict, then
c∗1 = c
∗
2. If, however, relationship (39) holds with equality, then U
′ (c˜∗1) ≤ U ′(c˜∗2), so
that likewise c∗1 = c
∗
2. Thus, either way, the claim follows from (5).
This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. It suffices to check incentive compatibility for patient and
impatient agents.
Incentive Compatibility for the Patient Type. There are two cases. Suppose first that
the cooperative’s excess funds suffice to accommodate an additional loan request. In
that case, the deviating patient agent receives a period-1 consumption of c∗1. Suppose
for the moment that n2 ≥ 2. Then, the additional loan request changes24 period-2
consumption of the n2− 1 remaining savers from c∗2 = ĉ2(n1, c∗1) to ĉ2 = ĉ2(n1 + 1, c∗1).
Hence, the incentive compatibility condition for a patient agent reads
c∗1 − α
n2 − 1
g(n)
max{ĉ2 − c∗1, 0} − β
n2 − 1
g(n)
max{c∗1 − ĉ2, 0} ≤ c˜∗2, (41)
24Because of our assumption on relative risk aversion, the objective consumption of the remaining
savers is actually strictly declining by the deviation, but this fact is not needed in the proof.
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where c˜∗2 is given by (7). Subtracting c
∗
1 on both sides of inequality (41) yields
−αn2 − 1
g(n)
max{ĉ2 − c∗1, 0} − β
n2 − 1
g(n)
max{c∗1 − ĉ2, 0} ≤
(
1− βn1
g(n)
)
(c∗2 − c∗1). (42)
The left-hand side of (42) is weakly negative. Moreover, since c∗2 ≥ c∗1, n1 ≤ n − 1 ≤
g(n), and β < 1, the right-hand side is weakly positive. Thus, (42) holds true. To deal
with the case n2 = 1, it suffices to note that the incentive compatibility condition in
that case is given by c∗1 ≤ c˜∗2, so that an analogous argument can be used.
Next, we consider the case in which a shortage of reserves prohibits the extension
of more than n1 loans. In that case, the sequential servicing constraint implies that
the deviating patient agent is successful in receiving a loan with probability n1
n1+1
, in
which case one of the impatient agents becomes rationed, and remains unsuccessful
with probability 1
n1+1
. There are two subcases.
Suppose first that c∗1 > θc
∗
2. In this case, the deviating patient agent feels com-
passion when making the loan impossible for one of the impatient agents, and the
incentive compatibility condition is given by
n1
n1 + 1
U
(
c∗1 − α
n2 − 1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)−
β
g(n)
(c∗1 − θc∗2)
)
+
1
n1 + 1
U(c˜∗2) ≤ U(c˜∗2). (43)
It is easy to see that condition (43) is equivalent to
c∗1 − α
n2 − 1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)−
β
g(n)
(c∗1 − θc∗2) ≤ c∗2 −
βn1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1). (44)
Rewriting yields
− β
g(n)
(c∗1 − θc∗2) ≤
(
1 + α
n2 − 1
g(n)
− βn1
g(n)
)
(c∗2 − c∗1), (45)
which holds as a consequence of c∗2 ≥ c∗1, n1 ≤ n− 1 ≤ g(n), and β < 1.
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Suppose next that c∗1 ≤ θc∗2, so that the deviating patient agent feels envy vis-a-vis
all of the impatient agents, including the impatient agent that did not receive credit.
In that case, the incentive compatibility condition reads
n1
n1 + 1
U
(
c∗1 − α
n2 − 1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)−
α
g(n)
(θc∗2 − c∗1)
)
+
1
n1 + 1
U(c˜∗2) ≤ U(c˜∗2), (46)
and the argument proceeds precisely as above. Thus, either way, the incentive com-
patibility condition for the patient agent holds.
Incentive Compatibility for the Impatient Type. Suppose that one of the impatient
depositors deviates by not taking up a loan. Then, her objective consumption in
period 1 is zero, while her objective consumption in period 2 becomes
ĉ2 ≡ ĉ2(n1 − 1, c∗1) =
(ne1 − (n1 − 1)c∗1)R + ne2
n2 + 1
. (47)
It is now useful to make the following observation.
Lemma A.3 The deviating impatient agent envies the borrowers, i.e., θĉ2 < c
∗
1.
Proof. Since by assumption Rθ < 1, it suffices to show that ĉ2 < Rc
∗
1. Via (47), this
is seen to be equivalent to c∗1 > e1 +
e2
R
, which in turn is implied by our assumption
that relative risk aversion exceeds one (cf. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). 
Given Lemma A.3, the incentive compatibility condition for the impatient agent25
reads
θĉ2 − αn1 − 1
g(n)
(c∗1 − θĉ2)−
αn2
g(n)
(1− θ)ĉ2 ≤ c˜∗1, (48)
25As mentioned in the body of the paper, to ensure that the LHS of inequality (48) is always
positive, it would suffice to assume that α is not too large. To see why, note that from the efficiency
of risk sharing, c∗2 < Rc
∗
1. Hence, using (47), ĉ2 > c
∗
2. Since, in addition, c
∗
2 ≥ c∗1 by Lemma A.2, we
get ĉ2 > c
∗
1. Exploiting this fact, as well as g(n) ≥ n − 1, the LHS of inequality (48) is seen to be
positive if α ≤ θ. Since θ ∈ (0, 1R ) is arbitrary, the claim indeed holds for any α < 1R .
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where c˜∗1 is given by (6). Subtracting c
∗
2 on both sides of inequality (48) leads to
θĉ2 − c∗2 − α
n1 − 1
g(n)
(c∗1 − θĉ2)−
αn2
g(n)
(1− θ)ĉ2 ≤
(
1 + α
n1 − 1
g(n)
)
(c∗1 − c∗2), (49)
which holds true because the right-hand side (left-hand side) is weakly positive (weakly
negative). Hence, incentive compatibility holds also for the impatient agent. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume first that R˜ > 1. Then, U ′ (c˜∗1) − R˜U ′(c˜∗2) = 0,
with c˜∗1 and c˜
∗
2 given by (6-7). Totally differentiating, we get
[
U ′′(c˜∗1)
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
)
− R˜U ′′(c˜∗2)
βn1
g(n)
]
dc∗1
+
[
U ′′(c˜∗1)
(
− αn2
g(n)
)
− R˜U ′′(c˜∗2)
(
1− βn1
g(n)
)]
dc∗2
+
[
−U ′′(c˜∗1)
n2
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)− R˜αU ′(c˜∗2)
]
dα
+
[
R˜U ′′(c˜∗2)
n1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)− R˜βU ′(c˜∗2)
]
dβ = 0, (50)
where R˜α = ∂R˜/∂α and R˜β = ∂R˜/∂β. Using dc
∗
2 = −n1Rn2 dc∗1, one finds that
λ1dc
∗
1 + λαdα + λβdβ = 0, (51)
with
λ1 = U
′′(c˜∗1)
(
1 + α
n1R + n2
g(n)
)
+ R˜U ′′(c˜∗2)
n1
n2
(
R− βn1R + n2
g(n)
)
, (52)
λα = −U ′′(c˜∗1)
n2
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)− R˜αU ′(c˜∗2), (53)
λβ = R˜U
′′(c˜∗2)
n1
g(n)
(c∗2 − c∗1)− R˜βU ′(c˜∗2). (54)
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We claim that λ1 < 0. Since the first term in (52) is negative, it suffices to show that
R− βn1R + n2
g(n)
> 0, (55)
but this follows immediately from R˜ > 1. Thus, λ1 is indeed negative. Moreover,
λα > 0 is immediate, which proves claim (i) in the case where R˜ > 1. Next, to see
that λβ > 0, we will show that
−U
′′(c˜∗2)
U ′(c˜∗2)
(c∗2 − c∗1) < −
g(n)
n1
R˜β
R˜
. (56)
Because of
R˜β = −R˜
n1R+n2
g(n)
R− β n1R+n2
g(n)
, (57)
condition (56) can be rewritten, together with
c∗2 − c∗1 =
c˜∗2 − c˜∗1
1 + αn2
g(n)
− βn1
g(n)
, (58)
as
−U
′′(c˜∗2)
U ′(c˜∗2)
(c˜∗2 − c˜∗1) <
g(n)
n1
n1R+n2
g(n)
R− β n1R+n2
g(n)
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
− βn1
g(n)
)
. (59)
We focus on the left-hand side of (59). Because of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion,
−U
′′(c˜∗2)
U ′(c˜∗2)
(c˜∗2 − c˜∗1) ≤
∫ c˜∗2
c˜∗1
−U
′′(c)
U ′(c)
dc = ln
U ′(c˜∗1)
U ′(c˜∗2)
= ln R˜ ≤ lnR ≤ 1. (60)
Next, we focus on the right-hand side of (59), and observe that
g(n)
n1
n1R+n2
g(n)
R− β n1R+n2
g(n)
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
− βn1
g(n)
)
>
R
R− β n1R
g(n)
(
1− βn1
g(n)
)
= 1. (61)
This proves claim (ii) if R˜ > 1. As for (iii), one notes that an increase in n, keeping ν1
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and ν2 fixed, is equivalent to discounting α and β by the same factor. The comparative
statics with respect to n follows, therefore, from parts (i) and (ii). The argument for
R˜ = 1 is similar, but uses directional derivatives. We omit the details. Finally, if
R˜ < 1, marginal effects on (c∗1, c
∗
2) are obviously zero. The proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4. See the text following the proposition. 
Appendix B. Analysis of the CRRA specification
In this section, we first derive the optimal contract in the case of constant relative risk
aversion, and subsequently discuss the need for Assumption 1.
B.1 Deriving the first best
Suppose that U(c˜) = c˜1−γ/(1− γ), where γ > 1 is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion. This utility function satisfies our assumptions.26 In the boundary
case R˜ ≤ 1, the first-best allocation is given by equation (8) in Proposition 1. It
therefore suffices to discuss the case where R˜ > 1. In this case, by Proposition 1,
c˜∗2
c˜∗1
= R˜1/γ, (62)
with
c˜∗1 =
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
)
c∗1 −
αn2
g(n)
c∗2, (63)
c˜∗2 =
βn1
g(n)
c∗1 +
(
1− βn1
g(n)
)
c∗2. (64)
Plugging (63) and (64) into (62), and recalling the budget constraint (5), we obtain a
26Indeed, U has a coefficient of relative risk aversion strictly exceeding one everywhere, as assumed
in the body of the paper. Note also that U ′(c˜) = c˜−γ for any c˜ > 0. In particular, limc˜→0 U ′(c˜) = −∞
and limc˜→∞ U ′(c˜) = 0. Thus, the Inada conditions hold. Finally, it is well-known (and easy to show)
that the CRRA utility function exhibits nonincreasing absolute risk aversion.
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system of two linear equations in the parameters c∗1 and c
∗
2. Solving the system yields
c∗1 =
(
e1 +
e2
R
) n
n1 +
n2ρ
R
, (65)
c∗2 =
(
e1 +
e2
R
) nρ
n1 +
n2ρ
R
(66)
with
ρ =
(
1 +
αn2
g(n)
)
R˜1/γ − βn1
g(n)
1 +
αn2
g(n)
R˜1/γ − βn1
g(n)
. (67)
Note that for α = β = 0, we simply have ρ = R1/γ, which corresponds to the solution
in the standard model of liquidity insurance between purely selfish agents.
B.2 Discussion of Assumption 1
Using the explicit solution derived above, we can provide the promised example in
which more compassion makes borrowers objectively worse off.
Example 1. Suppose that U(c˜) = −1/c˜3, and that the normalization factor is g(n) =
n−1, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The parameters of the model are n1 = 5, n2 = 2,
e1 = e2 = 1, and R = 4. Then, the first-best allocation for α = 0.01 and β = 0.00
is given by (c∗1, c
∗
2) = (1.53513, 2.14868). If, however, the compassion parameter is
raised to β = 0.01, then (c∗1, c
∗
2) = (1.53512, 2.14883), i.e., borrowers (savers) are worse
(better) off in objective terms.
Example 1 fails to satisfy condition lnR ≤ 1. One can show (details omitted) that,
similarly, the assumption of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion cannot be dropped
without losing the monotone comparative statics property with respect to the com-
passion parameter.
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Appendix C. Definitions of credit union specific variables
All our numerical CU specific variables are defined in terms of NCUA account data.
Table VII provides details.
Table VII. Call report definitions of econometric variables
Variable Definition Description
DEP RATE Acct 380t + Acct 381t
Acct 018t−1
Deposit rate: The sum of dividends on shares
(Acct 380) and interest on deposits (Acct 381) ac-
cumulated from Jan 1 to Dec 31 of year t over total
amount of shares and deposits (Acct 018) as of Dec
31 of year t− 1
LOAN RATE Acct 110t
Acct 025Bt−1
Loan rate: Interest on loans (Acct 110) accumulated
from Jan 1 to Dec 31 of year t over total amount of
loans and leases (Acct 025B) as of Dec 31 of year t−1
MEMBERS Acct 083t Number of current members: As of Dec 31 of year t
POT MEM Acct 084t Number of potential members: As of Dec 31 of year t
ASSETS Acct 010t Total assets: As of Dec 31 of year t
EQUITY Acct 931t + Acct 668t +
Acct 945t + Acct 658t +
Acct 940t + Acct 602t
Equity : The sum of regular reserves (Acct 931),
appropriation for non-conforming investments
(Acct 668), accumulated unrealized gains (losses) on
available-for-sale securities and other comprehensive
income (Acct 945), other reserves (Acct 658), undi-
vided earnings (Acct 940), net income (Acct 602) as
of Dec 31 of year t
RETURN Acct 120t + Acct 420t
Acct 799t−1
Net investment return: Interest income from invest-
ments (Acct 120) plus gain (or loss) from the sale
of investments (Acct 420) accumulated from Jan 1
to Dec 31 of year t over total investments (Acct 799
= Acct 799I+Acct 730B+Acct 730C) as of Dec 31 of
year t− 1
INCOME Acct 131t + Acct 659t +
Acct 430t + Acct 440t
Non-interest income: The sum of fee income
(Acct 131), other operating income (Acct 659), gain
or loss on disposition of fixed assets (Acct 430) and
other non-operating income (Acct 440) accumulated
from Jan 1 to Dec 31 of year t
EXPENSES Acct 671t Non-interest expense: Accumulated from Jan 1 to
Dec 31 of year t
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